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1.  Introduction
After  the  publication  of the  important  papers  of Paul  David  (1985)  and  Brian  Arthur  (1989)
economists  have  become  increasingly  interested  in the  concept  of path-dependence.  Traditional
economists  have  difficulties to model  a certain  class  of real-world  phenomena  that  can be  easily
explained by the concept of path-dependence.  Among the best known examples  are the QWERTY
keyboard  of typewriters  and  computers,  the left-hand  traffic in Britain,  and  the width  of the  rail
tracks  in Russia  or  Spain  versus  the  rest  of Europe.  Similar  phenomena  are  the  regional
concentrations of software producers in the Silicon  Valley or of swine and poultry producers in the
North West of Germany  and the South East of the Netherlands.  In all those and many  more cases
some  initial  advantage  combined  with  increasing  returns  to  scale  and/or  network  externalities
(Arthur,  1989  and  1990)  has resulted  in what  is called  "locked-in"  situations,  i.e.  an  equilibrium
that  although  it may be  inefficient  can only  be  abandoned  at  extremely  high costs.  Britain's  left-
hand  side  traffic,  for example,  causes  additional  costs.  Cars  built  by  continental  European  and
American  manufacturers  for the British  market  are produced  at higher  costs. But  the costs  of a
switch to right-hand traffic in Britain would be prohibitively  costly due to network externalities.  It
is impossible to transform the system in a piecemeal manner.  All drivers are interconnected  to each
other and  no one can switch  on his or her own. The adjustment  costs are estimated  to be  so high
that it is very unlikely that the present  system will be abandoned  in the foreseeable  future.  On the
other hand,  the decision of the Swedish government  to switch from left-hand  to right-hand traffic
in the mid-sixties  is a well-known example for a case where the adjustment costs were  considered
not to be prohibitively high because traffic was much less then.
The existence  of path-dependence  in a system has some interesting economic  implications (Arthur,
1989):
- the predictability  of the future  development  can  be very  small  at  certain  times,  at  other
times very high, when the system is locked-in
small historical events can become durable effects (non-ergodicity)
a path, once entered,  can possibly only be abandoned at extremely high costs (inflexibility),
there is a potential inefficiency of the system.
1Explaining path-dependence  the above mentioned  authors emphasize the role of increasing returns
to scale and the role of network externalities.  In this paper we present  a simple  model which  can
explain path-dependence  even if increasing returns to scale and network externalities  are absent.  In
our  model,  the  time  structure  of necessary  reinvestments  and  sunk  costs  cause  the  locked-in
situation.  Section  2  gives  a  brief  description  of  the  traditional  path-dependence  model.  The
concepts of sunk costs  and hysteresis,  which  are important for both the traditional  view of path-
dependence  and our model, are discussed in some detail.  We present  our own model  in section 3.
Section 4 deals with some modifications. Conclusions follow in section 5.
2.  The traditional Path-dependence  Concept
2.1.  Illustrations
Path-dependence  is generally conceived  as being governed  by stochastic  processes.  Although in its
original  version  it  is  not  related  to  economic  problems,  the  Polya  process  provides  a  good
analogy. ' The linear Polya process can be illustrated as follows:  Assume an urn containing one red
and one blue ball in t = 0.  In each of the following  periods t =  1, 2,  ...  one ball is randomly  drawn
from the urn.  Then the ball is returned  and another  one of the same color is added to the contents
of the urn. This can be formalized  as follows:
Probability  (Add Redt+l) = Proportion (Redt).
Figure la is the corresponding graphical representation.  Ten simulations are plotted in Figure  lb.
Figure 1: The standard  Polya  process
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I  This presentation follows Arthur et al (1987).
2Figure  lb shows that  in the first periods the proportions  are  subject to large  fluctuations.  But as
the number of balls increases  the effect of an added ball on the proportion  decreases.  The range in
which the proportion varies is  shrinking.  The consequence  of this behavior  is  a path-dependence.
The events of the earlier  periods dominate  the further  development  of the system,  as well  as the
system itself becomes more and more locked-in.
The  linear Polya process  has  an  infinite  number of equally  likely  equilibria  (Arthur  et  al,  1987).
However,  non-linear  Polya  processes  are  of  greater  interest  to  economists.  These  can  be
represented by the following equation:
Probability (Add Redt+i) =f (Proportion Redt),  wheref(.)  is some non-linear function.
As  illustrated  in  Figure  2a  this  stochastic  process  results  in  one  unstable  (B)  and  two  stable
equilibria (A and C). Simulation results  are given in figure 2b.
Figure  2: A  non-linear  Polya  process
2a: Non-linear urn function  2b: Ten realizations
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To  avoid  possible  misinterpretations;  Arthur  and  other  proponents  of the  traditional  path-
dependence  concept  do  not  claim  that  the  introduction  of new  technologies  (institutions)  or
regional  developments  follow simple linear or non-linear Polya processes.  However,  they  suggest
that these  stochastic  processes  are  subject to  complicated  and  not yet fully  understood  internal
driving forces causing results similar to the above-mentioned non-linear Polya processes.2
2  Polya  processes  are not the only  possibility to  investigate path-dependences  by simulation  models.  Balmann (1992)  applied  the concept  of
cellular automata in a simulation model to investigate the relevance  of path-dependences  in the development  of regional agricultural structure.
32.2.  Causes
What  causes  path-dependence  of economic  systems?  One  common  explanation  are  positive
feedbacks  (Arthur,  1988 and  1990). Figure 2a illustrates such a situation. An economic  example is
the competition  of two firms  whose  production  functions  exhibit  increasing  returns  to  scale.  A
situation  in which  both  are  equally  strong  is unstable.  The  only  stable  points  are  (natural)
monopolies.
Another  explanation  are  network  externalities.3 Network  externalities  cause  positive  feedbacks
that  are based  on interactions between  parts of the system. Each  part of the  system  has  positive
externalities  on  other  parts.  Network  externalities  are  often  used  to  explain  the  evolution  of
industrial  standards  like the typewriter  keyboard  QWERTY  or the videotape  system  VHS.4 The
key feature of network externalities are possible inefficiencies  from uncoordinated  behavior  of the
parts of the system.
Economies of scale and  network  externalities  are not sufficient to explain path-dependence.  Sunk
costs are of major importance  when locked-in  situations occur.  Consider a natural monopoly held
by firm F. This firm  has  a plant  which cannot  be sold,  and therefore,  has no better option than to
stay in the market despite the attempts of a potential  entrant E to take over the monopoly.  F will
hold the monopoly as long as sunk costs are significant. If all  costs were variable, E could threaten
to  enter  at  any time.  There  is  an  inherent  historical  character  in  such  locked-in  situations.  This
historical character shows up in sunk costs.
Baumol (1987)  defines sunk costs as follows:
"A sunk cost may or may not be larger than the minimum outlay a firm needs to operate
but,  once incurred,  it cannot be withdrawn  for some substantial  period without significant
loss."
This  means, for example,  that if a firm has already invested in a plant, this plant cannot  be sold  at
the same price  even  if it has  not  been  used.  Given  the plant  can  be  sold  at the  same  price,  sunk
costs  may  also  have  arisen  from  transaction  costs.  Transaction  costs  are  often  non-monetary
outlays. They can also lower the resale price.
But how should sunk costs been calculated?  A firm has to compare the returns to production with
the  opportunity  costs  of the  asset.  If the returns  are  not  high  enough  to  cover  the  opportunity
costs,  the  plant  should  be  sold.  Accordingly,  sunk  costs  should  be  defined  as  the  difference
between the outlay for an asset  and its opportunity costs.
3  Katz und Shapiro (1985).
4  Arthur (1988),  (1990),  Katz und Shapiro (1985).
4Figure  3: Sunk costs and  outlays
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The  existence  of sunk  costs  may  cause  limited  path-dependences.  For  an  entrepreneur  who
considers  an  investment,  the  net  present  value of the  expected  yields  and  outlays  must  not  be
negative. Once the investment is made, the outlays  on investment should not be taken into account
for  any  further  decision  if opportunity  costs  are  zero  and  the  total  outlay  is  sunk.  For  any
production  decision  the  entrepreneur  only  has  to  compare  the  returns  to  production  and  the
variable  costs. If product prices  decrease he will  continue  production,  while  other firms that will
have  to  invest  do  not  enter  the  market.  But  in  the  long  run  the  plant  has  to  be  replaced.  If
reinvestment is considered,  all costs are variable and production is suspended.  This phenomenon  of
delayed  reactions  is  called  hysteresis, a  kind of inertia. 5 Because  every  asset  can  be used  for  a
limited time only, management  theory claims that in the long run all costs are variable.
Figure  4: Hysteresis
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Hysteresis  can be  interpreted  as  a  sort  of short-term  locked-in  situation.  We  are  now  going  to
present our model where sunk costs lead to a locked-in situation of infinite duration.
Some examples and theoretical reflections about investment and hysteresis can be found in Dixit,  1992.
53.  The Model
3.1.  An Example
We introduce a simple model where path-dependence  of infinite duration occurs even if economies
of scale  and  network  externalities  are  absent.  To  show  this,  assume  a price-taking  firm  whose
output  per period  is either 0 or 1. Production  requires  two  indivisible  identical  inputs  with  cash
outlay of c=100  each  and  a lifetime of t=2 periods.  Assuming  an interest  rate of i=0. 1 and  input
synchronicity,  the threshold price P for a profit-maximizing  firm is
PŽ2.c  (1+i)  i=  115.2
(l+i)2 -1
Figure 5 illustrates the input synchronicity case and the corresponding  cash flow for P=1  15.2. Due
to the fact that the  initial  outlays  cannot  be  fully recovered  and,  thus,  have to be considered  as
sunk costs, investment decision need only be made in periods 0, 2, 4,....
Figure  5: Synchronicity
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Let us now assume that, for some historic  reason, the input  structure of our firm is characterized
by asynchronicity  (Figure 6). In this case the entrepreneur  has to decide in each period whether or
not to continue production. It is most interesting that, due to the sunk cost character of the inputs,
the  minimum price  for the  asynchronous  firm  is  below  the  minimum  price for  the  synchronous
firm. At  any time period  the asynchronous  firm  has  to  consider an  infinite planning  horizon  and
will purchase one input if the net present value of the cash flow is positive:
NPV:  =  - c  +  P->  0  .
i
6This is equivalent to
P>c(l+i)  which gives  P> 110.
Figure 6: Asynchronicity
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Therefore,  within the price range
-.  ((I+  i)2  _  -c.(  +i)=5.2
we can observe path-dependence  of inf  lite duration as illustrated by Figure 7.
Figure 7: Production  path in the rang. 115.2  > P > 110
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7Thus  we  have  shown  that  two  otherwise  identical,  profit-maximizing  firms  will,  under  certain
conditions,  react  completely  differently  to  changes  in expected  prices.  A firm that  has  inherited
input asynchronicity  is forced  to continue  production although the price  does not cover the costs
of production for newly established firms or for firms with input synchronicity.
To  be  sure,  the  input  complementarity  assumption  in  our  model  corresponds  to  the  network
externalities  in the traditional  path-dependence  concept.  Our model reveals a very basic feature  of
path-dependence.  It is not necessary to have a complicated  network  of producers  and consumers
that  leads  to the  adoption  of industrial  standards,  regional  concentration,  etc..  Rather  a  simple
complementarity is the necessary ingredient.
Necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  infinite  path-dependence  are  a  positive  interest  rate,  a
certain price path,  input  complementarity  combined  with indivisibilities,  asynchronicity,  and  sunk
costs. We will work out these conditions more precisely in the next section.
An  intuitive  explanation  of the  occurrence  of infinite  path-dependence  in  our  model  follows.
Compare  the cost streams of the two firms  in figure 8. These are only  equivalent  if i=0.  For any
positive interest  rate the cost structure of the asynchronous  firm is  more favorable,  resulting  in a
lower minimum price.
Figure  8: Cost streams





We now investigate the reason for the infinite duration  of the path-dependence  in more detail.  Let
S  denote  the  synchronous  firm  and  let  A  denote  the  asynchronous  firm.  Given  input
complementarity  and  indivisible  inputs  as  in the  above  example,  it  is  sufficient  for  infinite  path-
dependence that the average costs of S (ACS)  are higher than the expected price P and the average
costs of A (ACA) are lower than P:





ACA = i  -c.  CRFi,N ( i)-t +  +i)  -
t=l  t=l
where c is the outlay for an investment, CRFi,N is the capital recovery factor for interest rate i and
N periods.  N is  the  lifetime  of a  new plant.  N-n  is  the rest  of a  plant's  lifetime  at  the  time  of
decision.
A necessary condition is
ACs > ACA  or
0 < ACs - ACA
=oO<c-i-CRFN  7S(l+i)-t - (l+i)-(t+N-n)





_(  l+i)-t - (1  + i)- (t+N- n) > 0  :>  i >0; N > n
t=l  t=l
Further, the necessary  conditions are a positive outlay,  a positive interest rate and a plant's age that
is strictly less than its lifetime.
4.  Modifications
The model above is very specific.  Some modifications and further investigations  may be helpful to
generalize the results. But there are a many possible modifications. We  cannot investigate them all.
So we will concentrate on opportunity costs and on the case of heterogeneous  inputs.
4.1.  Relevance  of Opportunity Costs
For the calculations above the costs for the already existing plant were assumed to be totally sunk.
Now we drop this assumption.  The difference  of the average  cost of the two firms is  equal  to the
interest of the remaining value of the existing plant (1/CRFi,N  is the present value of an annuity).
9NACS-ACA  c  =CRFi,N ACS-ACA=i.c-CRFi,N  (1+i)  =  i-c-C
t=l  CRFi,N - n
This means that if in situation A the  existing plant  could be sold  at its imputed value,  sunk costs
would  be zero.  In  this  case  the  difference  ACs - ACA would  also  be zero,  and  the  necessary
condition would not be met.
If sunk  costs  are  positive,  opportunity  costs  of the  already  existing  inputs  are  lower  than  their
calculatory  value. This means that this kind of path-dependence  is caused by too low opportunity
costs.
4.2.  Complementary  Inputs with Different Cost Structure and Life Time
Under  the  assumptions  of subsections  3.1  and  3.2,  path-dependence  will  either  be  of infinite
duration  or not occur at all. However, one can easily imagine conditions where path-dependences
will disappear after a finite time period. For example, think of two complementary  inputs with cost
structure and lifetime as illustrated in figure 9. Provided the price path follows certain conditions,  a
profit-maximizing  firm will  reinvest input B  in t=2,  4,  6,  but not in t=8.  Obviously,  this situation
can be classified  somewhere in between pure hysteresis and infinite path-dependence.  However, in
contrast to the case of infinite path-dependence,  the interest rate may be zero here.
Figure  9: Indivisible inputs
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If the interest rate is larger than zero an asynchronous  situation with cost structure  and lifetime as
in figure 9 may, compared to the case of synchronicity,  lead to path-dependence,  too. For this it is,
10again,  necessary and sufficient that
ACs > P >  ACA  at any time t.
For this to hold it is necessary that positive sunk costs exist at any time t.
5.  Conclusions
We  have presented  a simple  model which  shows  that, under  certain  conditions,  complementarity
and  sunk  costs  lead  to  a  locked-in  situation  of infinite  duration.  Production  and  investment
decisions  differ  significantly  in  situations  with  or  without  sunk  costs.  Despite  its  simplicity,  the
model  may  help  to  understand  real  world  phenomena.  Consider,  for  example,  the :problem  of
educational  choice in agriculture.  Investments  made some time ago  cause sunk costs. Thus  it may
seem  attractive to a farmer's  son or daughter  to have  an agricultural  education  and take  over the
farm.  At  some  later  stage  further  investments  are  necessary.  Costs  for  education. are  sunk  and
often, opportunity costs (earning  possibilities in the non-agricultural  sector) are low. Therefore,  an
investment will be the right decision. This complementarity  and asynchronicity  of labor  and capital
can  cause  path-dependence,  as  in  our  model.  This  offers  an  additional  explanation  for  slow
structural change in agriculture.
So  far  we  have  not  mentioned  the  concept  of efficiency.  In  our  example  both  firms  decide
rationally  with  regard  to  their  starting  position.  But  which  situation  is  more  favorable,  the
synchronicity  or the asynchronicity  case? At a first glance,  asynchronicity  seems  favorable since it
is possible to realize a higher interest  rate for the liquid capital  compared to any investment  in the
capital market.  This conclusion  does not, of course, hold if one takes into account the fixed capital
(c  - CRFiN /  CRFN n in the  example  of section  3.2).  Then an  asynchronous  firm  has  the  same
threshold price as a synchronous firm to make profits.
Table  1 shows the  net present values  of three firms  (of the type  described  in section  3.2)  which
differ  with  respect  to  their  sunk  costs  for  different  price  expectations.  A  denotes  a  firm  with
asynchronicity,  So denotes  a firm with synchronicity  and no assets at to.  S1 is a synchronous firm
which  has  invested at tO-n.  The firms'  performance  is equally good  if the price  is higher  than the
threshold price.  The only case where the asynchronous  firm becomes  superior to the synchronous
firm S 1 is when the price decreases below  c CRFi N (half of the threshold  price). In all other  cases
synchronous  firms,  S1 or  So,  are  superior.  The  differences  between  the  firms  are  due  to  the
structure of sunk costs. If we leave aside the extreme case where the price is less than c CRFi,N we
can conclude that inefficiencies  are more likely to occur with input asynchronicity.
11Table 1: Net present values  for synchronous and  asynchronous  firms
Expected Price P  A  S1 So
CRFi,N  P-2-  cCRFi,N
P < c CRFiN  CRFiN-n  CRFiN-n 
c CRFiN < P  CRFi,N  P-2. c. CRFi,N
P < c(l+i)  CRFiN-n  CRFiN-n
c(l+i)<P  <(  CRF.N  )  P-c'CRFiN(l+(+ i)n-))<  P-2-c-CRFi N
P<cCP-------  <  CR  <  0
P< 2 c CRFi N U  CR  Ni)  CRFi,Nn
P-2- cCRFi,N  P-2. c  CRFiN  P - 2  c  CRFi,N
2cCRFi  <P  = 
Another  aspect of inefficiency  may  arise when the continuation of production  and investment  has
negative  side-effects  on the development  of other firms.  This would be  true if the firms  involved
compete for the same scarce factors  such as land in the case of agricultural production.
Our conclusion that  sunk costs  may cause  inefficiencies  and that the duration  of this situation is
not  necessarily  limited  by the  years  of use of the  single  investments  has  implications  for  policy
making.  Whenever political signals  (e.g.  subsidies)  are  misleading in the sense  that they  stimulate
investments  in  otherwise  nonprofitable  production,  the  consequences  become  more  severe  in  a
situation of path-dependence.  With regard to the transformation  process of the agricultural  sector
in East Germany and Eastern Europe such considerations  are actually relevant.
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